The Philosophy of Jurgen Habermas_ A Critical Introduction_Uwe Steinhoff

Uwe Steinhoff-The Philosophy of Jurgen Habermas_ A Critical Introduction (2009)

Format PDF 1.73 MB

Pages  299

Introduction 1

1. “Communicative” versus Purposive Rationality 4

1.1. The Unrivalled Status of Purposive Rationality 5

1.2. Habermas’s Attempt to Distinguish Communicative Rationality

from Purposive Rationality 9

1.2.1. Habermas’s Explication(s) of the Concept of Rationality 9

1.2.1.1. Actions Oriented towards Success vs. Assertions

(Oriented towards Reaching Understanding) 10

1.2.1.2. Habermas’s Defi nitions of Rationality 14

1.2.2. The Failure of All Arguments against the Reducibility of

Understanding-oriented Action to Success-oriented Action 20

1.2.2.1. The Failure of All Arguments against the Reducibility

of Communicative Action to Strategic Action 21

1.2.2.2. The Case of Speech Acts 35

1.3. From Action Oriented towards Reaching Understanding to a

Discourse Theory of Rationality 46

1.3.1. On the Alleged Link with the Practice of Argumentation 49

1.3.2. The Claims of a Discourse Theory of Rationality 51

1.3.2.1. On the Differences between Justifi able, Valid, and Justifi ed Norms 51

1.3.2.2. On the Difference between the Justifi ed Status of a

Norm and the Rationality of Its Observance 54

1.3.2.2.1. On the Difference between “Cognitive Claims” and Claims to Rationality 55

1.3.2.2.2. The Alleged Primacy of Communicative Action over Strategic Action 56

1.3.2.2.2.1. The “Parasitism” Argument 56

1.3.2.2.2.2. The Argument from the Theory of Meaning 61

1.3.2.2.2.3. The Argument from the Stronger “Implications of Rationality” and “Ontological

Presuppositions” of Communicative Action 64

1.3.3. Integration or Confusion? 72

2. The Justification of Discourse Ethics 78

2.1. Habermas’s Preliminary Considerations 79

2.2. In Search of Suitable Norms of Discourse and Presuppositions of Argumentation 94

2.2.1. Methods of Identifying Norms of Discourse 94

2.2.2. Transcendental Pragmatics 96

2.2.2.1. Apel’s Notion of Final Justifi cation and Its Untenability 96

2.2.2.2. The “Identifi cation/Demonstration” of Presuppositions of Argumentation and the

“Execution” of Final Justifi cation 100

2.2.2.2.1. Kuhlmann’s Futile Attempt at a Final Justifi cation for the Validity of the

Presuppositions of Argumentation 100

2.2.2.2.2. How to Provide Final Justifi cation for Specifi c Presuppositions of Argumentation?

Apel’s Dogmatic “Refl ections” and Kuhlmann’s Contrived “Dialogues” 107

2.2.2.2.3. The Failure of the Criterion of Final Justifi cation 126

2.2.2.3. The Problem of the Status of the So-called Presuppositions of

Argumentation and Rules of Discourse 134

2.3. The Untenability of the Principle U and the Failure of its Alleged Derivation 143

2.4. The Failure of Habermas’s Justifi cation of Consensus Theory 153

2.5. The Unsolved Problem of the Application of Norms Justified by U or D to Real Situations 167

3. The Failure of Discourse Ethics and the Theory of CommunicativeAction in Their Attempted  Empirical Demonstration and Application to Politics, Law and Society 181

3.1. Psychology 181

3.1.1. The Development of the Self 181

3.1.2. Moral Development 183

3.1.3. Communicative Pathologies 184

3.2. Evolution 193

3.2.1. Hominization 193

3.2.2. Socio-cultural Evolution 194

3.3. Critical Social Theory? 200

3.3.1. Habermas’s Theory of Order 200

3.3.2. The Colonization Thesis 210

3.3.3. The “Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy” 219

3.3.4. Habermas’s Theory of Modernity 236

Conclusion 241

Appendix 243

Notes 249

Bibliography 272

Index 281